



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
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
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DAILY BRIEF

South Vietnam: [Internal stresses in the Khanh regime appear to be growing.]

[Brigadier General Ton That Xung, commander of the I Corps in the northern provinces, has described South Vietnam as becoming "another Laos," with various political groups unable or unwilling to pull together against the Viet Cong. Xung recently told an American observer that although the military situation in his area seemed satisfactory at the moment, in the country as a whole it was deteriorating.]

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[The scheduled execution today of Diem's younger brother, Ngo Dinh Can, may also add to the disarray and stimulate dissatisfaction with the regime, particularly among the Catholics. Many elements of the important Catholic minority probably will interpret this as an act of reprisal by the Buddhists.]

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Cyprus: UN mediator Tuomioja may recommend a Cyprus solution based on a quasi-federal system, according to the US ambassador in Nicosia.

The Finnish diplomat apparently envisages giving the Greek Cypriots more in the way of a majority rule than in the 1960 constitution, while granting a limited measure of autonomy to five or six areas with a predominantly Turkish population. He also foresees a long-term UN observer role and some international participation in, or supervision of, the judicial system.

There is no indication that such a plan would be acceptable to either community. The Greeks still demand complete majority rule in a unitary state, with the Turks protected by "adequate minority guarantees." Having steadily improved their strategic position in recent weeks, they are in no mood for compromise.

Those Turkish Cypriots, including Vice President Kuchuk, who still demand partition would initially reject such a plan. It also probably would fall short of many of the demands of the more moderate Turkish Cypriots--and many leaders of the Ankara government--who have indicated they would accept a form of federation if it provided adequate protection for the Turkish Cypriot minority.

Tuomioja plans to present his final recommendations soon, and to return to his post as ambassador to Sweden by mid-June.

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Communist China - USSR: Peiping's latest letter to the Soviet Communist Party reflects its complete confidence that the USSR has been unable to command sufficient support to call an international Communist meeting.

The publication of the 7 May letter is intended to make it even more difficult for the USSR to convince its wavering supporters of the need for a conference.

The Chinese, noting the contrary "advice from our party and many other fraternal parties," drive home the point that if the Soviets "hurriedly" convene a meeting on their own initiative they will be responsible for a split in the movement. This point has been made implicitly by the Italian, Rumanian, and other parties.

The letter supports other indications that the Chinese, still minority contestants in the struggle with Moscow, prefer to avoid a formal split which would leave Peiping in control of a rump body, and that they intend to continue the struggle from within the international movement. The letter hypocritically proclaims a Chinese desire to hold a meeting that would maintain "unity," but claims that adequate preparations for a meeting would require four, five, or even more years.

Even a bilateral meeting, which the Chinese profess to favor, could not be held soon. The USSR had suggested this month as a good time for such a meeting, but Peiping, waiting until the deadline had arrived, insists that clearly the two parties could not meet now and that sometime next May might do.

(continued)

9 May 64

DAILY BRIEF

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That the Chinese have no intention of talking with the Russians, however, is shown by their statement that if either side feels that the time is not ripe even in May 1965, the talks can be postponed even further.

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